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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) granting jurisdiction over appeals transferred by the Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Draper City contends that the issues should 'be restated to more accurately reflect the 
nature of the inquiry and basis of the decision of the trial court upholding the exercise of 
legislative discretion by the Draper City Council in denying Harmon's rezoning request. As 
a result. Draper City suggests the issues should be restated as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in determining that the legislative record 
supports a reasonable basis for the exercise of legislative discretion by the Draper City 
Council in furtherance of the police power by denying Harmon's request for a zone change. 
2. Whether the trial court applied the appropriate standard of review by 
concluding that where the reasonableness or propriety of a rezoning decision in the exercise 
of legislative discretion by the governing body of municipality is reasonably debatable, it 
should be upheld by the courts as not being arbitrary or capricious under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-1001. 
Draper City agrees that the correction of error standard of review applies to both of 
these issues. 
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PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use 
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under 
authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise 
of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision 
is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; 
and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a land use action arising from the exercise of legislative discretion by the 
Draper City Council in denying the application of Harmon City, Inc. and Johansen-
Thackeray & Company, Inc. (jointly referred to herein as "Harmons") to rezone their 
property from residential/agricultural use to an intensive retail commercial zoning 
designation.1 
1
 See FN 2 of Brief of Appellant Harmon City, Inc. regarding acquisition by 
Harmons of Johansen-Thackeray's interest in the property and the prior Order of this Court 
dated March 11, 1999, dismissing Johansen-Thackeray as a party to this appeal. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Harmons applied to Draper City for rezoning of a 10.277 acre parcel of land which 
is currentiy zoned RR-43, for residential/agricultural use. (R. 272) It simultaneously 
applied for a conditional use permit which required the zoning change. Ifs request was that 
the property be rezoned to C-2 Neighborhood Commercial. (R. 272-73) The General Plan 
contemplated a Mixed-Use (Planned Development) zoning for the parcel, a zoning which 
does not expressly include the C-2 commercial zoning. (R. 271, 365, 382) In addition, the 
planning process was already under way to prepare a neighborhood master plan for this area 
of Draper City which might affect the future use of the Harmons' property. (R. 400) 
After a favorable report by the City's planning staff and a recommendation of 
approval by the Planning Commission, the City Council held a public meeting on the 
rezoning request. After consideration of all of the information before it, the Council voted 
3-2 to deny Harmons' request. (R. 403) It took no action on Harmons' subsequent request 
that it reconsider the zoning application. (R. 407-08) 
Harmons then filed this action with the district court seeking judicial review of the 
City's land use decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. The parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment based upon the legislative record. By a Memorandum 
Decision dated July 17, 1998, the Court ruled that the City's denial of the rezoning was not 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. (R. 470) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Draper City General Plan proposes that the Harmons5 property be 
Mixed-Use (Planned Development). The General Plan does not expressly provide for any 
specific zoning designation, much less the commercial C-2 zoning sought by Harmons. 
(K 381-83) 
2. The description of development in the Mixed-Use (Planned Development) 
area is: 
The mixture of uses within this category should include master 
planned developments consisting of office, light manufacturing, 
retail, residential and recreation and open space components. 
These areas are envisioned as providing for a compatible mix of 
residential and non-residential uses in well-planned activity 
centers, that promote day and evening use. The mix of land 
uses recommended may vary from location to location. The 
size of individual projects may vary, however, each 
development must respect surrounding parcels and allow for 
future residential and vehicular connections. 
* * * • * * 
Generally, the types of uses encouraged in these areas include 
auto dealerships, corporate and speculative offices, lodging 
facilities, regional commercial centers, clean manufacturing 
facilities, a variety of residential densities, convention facilities, 
service retail, movie and live theaters, and other similar 
activities. 
(R. 382) 
3. During the January 8, 1998, Planning Commission Meeting, many public 
comments were made, both for and against plaintiffs' proposed zoning change and 
development. Many of those comments reflected legitimate concerns: 
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a. Several persons stated concerns over whether a 24-hour retail 
operation was compatible with the adjoining neighborhoods as contemplated by the 
provisions of the general plan's proposed use of the area for mixed uses "providing 
for a compatible mix of residential and non-residential uses in well-planned activity 
centers that promote day and evening use." 
b. There was some concern that a 71,700 square foot retail store was not 
the type of commercial use appropriate to the uses contemplated under the general 
plan. 
c There was concern expressed over water drainage problems presented 
by the proposed development. 
d. There was concern over the impact of the development on the 
residential nature of the adjoining properties. 
e. Some comments supported commercial use of the land in a manner 
more compatible with the residential properties abutting plaintiffs3 property. 
£ A petition containing 200 signatures of those opposing the project was 
presented to the Commission. 
g. Of all of the public comments, approximately half were from 
individuals in favor of rezoning and development approval. 
(R. 384-96) 
4. At the February 3, 1998, City Council meeting, the mayor noted that the 
Council had "received the proposal and information from the developer, minutes of the 
5 
Planning Commission, staff reports, letters, calls and petitions expressing diverse opinions 
from citizens, and newspaper articles. He noted that the Council is well informed on the 
issues and asked for everyone to be considerate and please avoid repetition and provide new 
and factual information.35 (R. 398-404) 
5. At the February 3 meeting, three persons spoke in opposition to Harmons' 
application and five spoke in favor. (R. 398-404) 
6. One area resident noted that a neighborhood master plan for the 700 East 
area was still being formulated and expressed concern that approving this proposed rezone 
would have a negative impact prior to the completion and approval of that 700 East Master 
Plan. (R. 400) 
7. The Council voted 3-2 to deny the rezoning application. The reasons for 
denial turn on the compatibility of the C-2 zoning with the adjoining residential areas as 
contemplated by the Mixed-Use (Planned Development) classification in the General Plan. 
(R. 403) 
8. On March 3, 1998, Harmons requested that the City Council reconsider the 
denial of the proposed C-2 zoning for the property. A Harmons representative stated that 
there was nothing new to add to the record. Council member Dansie noted that the 700 
East Master Plan was still in the planning process and had not yet been presented to the 
City Council. She expressed the view that it would be necessary to evaluate that plan prior 
to changing her decision with respect to this proposed zoning. Lacking a motion in favor 
of the reconsideration, the issue was not voted upon. (R. 407-08) 
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9. On March 4, 1998, Harmons filed its complaint with the district court 
seeking review of the rezoning denial pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. (R. 1-49) 
10. Harmons and the City filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the trial 
court, agreeing that the case presented questions of law that could be resolved based on the 
legislative record. (R. 162-336, 362-410) 
11. The trial court issued its ruling by Memorandum Decision dated July 17, 
1998, ruling that the City's denial of the rezoning was not arbitrary or capricious. 
(R. 467-72) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this appeal, Harmons not only seeks to reverse the ruling of the trial court that 
Draper City's denial of Harmons' request for rezoning was not arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal, but also invites this Court to reject the long-standing and well-established legal 
precedents on which it is based by eliminating any meaningful distinction between the 
standard of judicial review for legislative actions of the governing body of a municipality as 
opposed to administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Draper City contends that this case 
presents an important opportunity for this Court to recognize and reaffirm the critical 
distinction between the administrative and legislative decisions of a municipality; and the 
appropriate standard of review applicable to them in determining whether such actions are 
"arbitrary or capricious" under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS AN IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF LEGISLATIVE AS OPPOSED TO ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS OF 
A MUNICIPALITY UNDER THE "ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS" 
LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001. 
A. THE DRAPER CITY COUNCIL WAS CLEARLY ACTING IN A 
LEGISLATIVE CAPACITY IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST 
FOR REZONING. 
In addressing the issues presented here, it is important to recognize and keep in mind 
that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act. 
Sandy City v. Salt Lalce County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992). See also Scherbel v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) ("the passage of general zoning 
ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative 
branch."); Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-36 (Utah 1961) (zoning is a 
legislative function carrying with it wide discretion). See also Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City. 
958 P.2d 245, 25 n. 6 (Utah App. 1998) ("the Supreme Court of Utah termed rezonings 
'administrative' for purposes of holding diem to be unfit subjects for referendum. For all 
other purposes, however, rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative.") The Draper 
City Council was clearly acting in a legislative capacity when it reviewed and acted upon 
Harmons5 rezoning application. 
It is also important to understand that the legislative process is inherently political in 
nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all concerned in 
furtherance of the general welfare. Tenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1156 (Utah 1983) 
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("broad matters of a political nature are best determined in the legislative branch of 
government35). The legislative acts of zoning and planning affect the broad interests of all 
citizens in a municipality and have traditionally been granted substantial judicial deference 
based upon the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. 
B. AN ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE BROAD JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
AND PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AFFORDED TO A 
MUNICIPALITY'S LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS. 
Legislative decisions of municipalities in the exercise of their zoning and police 
powers are reviewed by courts with considerable deference. 1 Ziegler, Rathlcopf s the Law 
of Zoning and Planning (4 ed. 1989) § 3.04[1] at 3-22 (cited herein as "Rathlcopf s°). The 
burden of overcoming this deference and presumption of validity lies with the plaintiff who 
is making the challenge to the validity of the decision. Id. Utah law is in accord with this 
general proposition. See E.g., Call v. City of West Tordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 
1980) (ordinance passed within the scope of legislatively granted power is accorded a 
presumption of constitutional validity). See also Naylor at 29 (cc[W]e are more than 
cognizant of the proposition that the governing body of a city is endowed with considerable 
latitude in determining the proper uses of property within its confines.") The Utah 
Supreme Court has traditionally granted municipalities considerable discretion in their 
exercise of the legislative power to zone. 
In the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and 
its scope is limited to a determination of whether or not the action of 
the Board of County Commissioners as a legislative body is illegal, 
arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. No contention is made that 
the county did not act within its grant of powers from the legislature 
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in its adoption of the original zoning ordinance. The prior decisions 
of this court without exception have laid down the rule that the 
exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by 
the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning 
plan, its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district to be 
zoned are matters which lie solely within that discretion. It is the 
policy of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions that it will 
avoid substituting its judgment for that of the legislative body of the 
municipality. 
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Assfq Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1151-52 
(Utah 1976). 
The burden a plaintiff must bear in overcoming the presumption of validity is 
substantial. 
While the most common statement of the degree of proof required to 
overcome the presumption of validity is that the issue must be 
removed from the area of reasonable debate, the courts have used a 
variety of language to describe what all agree is an extraordinary 
burden. A number of courts require that the litigant asserting 
invalidity prove by "clear and convincing33 evidence that the ordinance 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or otherwise invalid. Some courts require 
"clear and affirmative" evidence of invalidity, and others simply require 
that the invalidity be "clearly"3 shown or conclusively demonstrated. 
1 Anderson § 3.21 at 136-37. 
Where a presumption of validity has been given to zoning decisions, but the 
evidence in support of a decision is fairly debatable, the court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the body making the zoning decision. Smith Investment at 253; 
3 Ziegler § 42.07[2] at 42-54,55. This is clearly the position of Utah courts as apparent 
from this Court's recent review of the well-reasoned line of authority cautioning against 
unwarranted judicial intrusion into municipal legislative functions. Smith Investment at 
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252-53. See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1969) (it is 
of no importance whether the court agrees with the wisdom of the legislative decision); 
Gayland at 636 (the fact that the evidence could have led to a contrary decision does not 
lead to the conclusion that the decision which was made is not supported by the evidence); 
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comnfrs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 
1979) (courts should not interfere with land use decisions "unless it is shown that there is 
no reasonable basis to justify the action taken."); Smith Investment at 952-53 (selection of 
one of alternative methods of solving a problem is entirely within city's discretion). 
The appropriate standard of review requires that the plaintiffs affirmatively overcome 
the presumption of validity afforded the City's denial of their rezoning application. It is not 
sufficient that they disagree with the outcome or can point to indicia that the decision could 
have gone either way. Presumably any split 3-2 vote of the governing body of a 
municipality on a legislative matter would fall under that category. They must clearly 
demonstrate that the evidence leads only to the conclusion that the City's actions were 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. As noted in Gayland. supm^ if there is another possible 
reasonable outcome, the Court must defer to the City's legislative discretion. 
C. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD HAS A 
DIFFERENT MEANING WHEN APPLIED TO LEGISLATIVE 
DECISIONS. 
Harmons invites this Court to apply the same standard of review set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 for determining whether the actions of municipality are arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal regardless of whether the nature of decision at issue is categorized as 
11 
"legislative," "administrative" or "quasi-judicial." The courts have long recognized a clear 
and meaningful distinction, both statutory and judicial, between the discretion afforded to 
administrative or quasi-judicial decisions of local governmental entities as opposed to 
legislative actions, in recognition of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. 
The false premise that underlies Harmons' position is erroneously assuming there is 
some inconsistency or insurmountable conflict between the "reasonably debatable" standard 
of review articulated by this Court in the Smith Investment opinion when analyzed in the 
context of the arbitrary and capricious language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. In point 
of fact, those positions are easily reconciled by a recognition of the fundamental distinction 
between the character of administrative or quasi-judicial decisions as opposed to legislative 
actions. 
In this challenge to the City's legislative action, Harmons argues that the trial court 
failed to apply the "substantial evidence" measure to determine whether the decision to deny 
its zoning request was arbitrary or capricious. That standard, however, comes from case 
law which addresses administrative land use decisions and not fundamentally legislative 
decisions, ^nwn v. Sandv Cirv Rd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) (city's 
administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinances); Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt 
Take Citv Corp., 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah App. 1997)(board of adjustment decision denying 
variance); Y,nrh™ v. Ed. of AHjnstnu-nt of Salt Lake Citv, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) 
( s a m e ) ; Por t ion v. Utah rnnnfv Ed. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1995) 
(review of trial court's finding of arbitrary and capricious action by county in approving 
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special exception to zoning ordinance); Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 
(Utah App. 1988) (denial of conditional use permit); First Nat31 Bank of Boston v. County 
Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990) (administrative 
evaluation of property for tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714 P.2d 1133 
(Utah 1986) (administrative procedures for processing variance requests). 
The bulk of these cases address decisions of boards of adjustment. The distinction 
between the quasi-judicial decisions of a board of adjustment as opposed to legislative 
municipal zoning decisions is significant. To begin with, boards of adjustment have no 
legislative powers and are not permitted to have those powers. E.g., Salt Lake County 
Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City 879 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah App. 1994) 
(improper to delegate legislative function to board); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County 827 
P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992) ("Boards of adjustment can tailor a zoning or rezoning 
ordinance to specific, unforeseen circumstances, but they lack the authority to determine 
zoning classifications of their own accord.53) See also 5 Young, Anderson's American Law of 
Zoning (4 ed. 1996) § 21.04 at 699 (referred to herein as "Anderson") ("[A] board of 
adjustment is an administrative body which may be authorized to exercise quasi-judicial 
powers. . . It is a body without legislative authority.33) 
The Utah Legislature has also provided separate statutory provisions for appeals 
from board of adjustment decisions, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708, as distinguishable from a 
city's land use decisions, § 10-9-1001. If the nature of the judicial review were the same in 
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both instances, these separate provisions would be redundant. Neither constitutional 
principles nor the rules of statutory construction support such a conclusion. 
There is no question that Utah law applies the "substantial evidence" measure to the 
arbitrary and capricious evaluation of administrative decisions. There is, however, no Utah 
case law which would support application of that standard to a legislative decision by the 
governing body of a municipality. 
In Walker v. Brigham City. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993) the Supreme Court applied a 
"wholly discordant to reason and justice" measure to the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applied to a legislative decision. Wallcer at 349 (citations omitted). In Crestview-Holladay 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co.. 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court, 
reviewing a challenge to a rezoning by the Salt Lake County Commission, observed that 
"[i]n the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and its scope is limited 
to a determination of whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners as a 
legislative body is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious." Id. at 1151-52. The 
court deferred to the legislative body and found the zoning not to be arbitrary and 
capricious, upholding it as enacted "pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that 
portion of the county." Id. at 1152. Likewise, in Naylor v. Salt Lalce City Corp., 410 P.2d 
764 (Utah 1966), the Supreme Court upheld a rezoning by a city's legislative body. The 
standard it applied in determining whether the action was arbitrary and capricious was 
whether "there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must therefore 
be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." Naylor at 766. 
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This Court has recently upheld a city's decision to downzone property, applying a 
"reasonably debatable" standard with deference to the legislative decision maker. Smith 
Investment at 253. Consistent with Utah case law deferring to legislative decision makers, 
the Washington Supreme Court has defined the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable 
to legislative decisions. 
An action is arbitrary or capricious when the legislative body reaches 
its decision "willfully and unreasonably, without consideration and in 
disregard of facts or circumstances." A decision reached after due 
consideration on a matter upon which there is room for differing 
opinions is not arbitrary or capricious. This is so, even though a 
reviewing court may believe the decision is erroneous. 
Sparks v. Douglas County. 904 P.2d 738, 742 (Wash. 1995) (citations omitted). Where 
the City has clearly deliberated over alternatives and given consideration to differing 
positions, it has not, as a matter of law, acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 
Even the cases from other jurisdictions cited by Harmons fail to support an 
administrative standard of review for legislative decisions. In Belcher v. Kitsap County, 808 
P.2d 750, 752 (Wash. App. 1991), the court upheld a denial of a rezoning on much the 
same grounds that Harmons objects to here. For example, the Belcher court noted it was 
proper to consider the nature of adjacent property uses and the announced policy of 
proposed uses for the area. Belcher at 752-53. Bentley v. Valco, Inc, 741 P.2d 1266 
(Colo. App. 1987) fails in two respects. First, it is a review of an administrative decision to 
grant a special use permit, more akin to a conditional use permit than to a rezoning. 
Bentley at 1267. Second, the decision was based on whether there was "no competent 
evidence'5 to support the decision. Id. "No competent evidence'3 lies a considerable 
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distance from "substantial evidence" on the evidentiary continuum. In Kanfer v. 
Montgomery County Council 373 A.2d 5 (Md. App. 1977), the court applied the "fairly 
debatable" standard, Id. at 12 and only reversed the rezoning decision on the basis of 
"overwhelming evidence" weighing against the basis for the decision. Id. at 14. Again, 
"overwhelming evidence" against is not close to "substantial evidence" in support. 
Draper City urges this Court to take advantage of this opportunity to reaffirm the 
long-standing law of Utah and apply it to the arbitrary and capricious standard of Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 by recognizing the distinction between the appropriate measure of 
judicial review of legislative actions as opposed to administrative or quasi-judicial decisions 
of a municipality. 
II. THE CITY'S LEGISLATIVE DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
A review of the legislative record in this matter, granting the City's exercise of 
legislative discretion the appropriate level of deference and presumption of validity, leads to 
the conclusion that the City's denial of Harmons' rezoning request was not arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal. 
A. THE "PUBLIC CLAMOR" ANALYSIS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. 
Another fundamental flaw in Harmons' approach to this case is the contention that 
the City acted improperly under the influence of "public clamor," which is another stark 
illustration of a failure to acknowledge the legislative context in which this decision was 
made, as opposed to administrative or quasi-judicial decisions. Such an analysis fails to 
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recognize the inherently political and therefore subjective nature of the legislative decision 
making process. By way of illustration, any discussion of whether the proposed rezoning of 
a particular piece of property is "compatible" with neighboring uses is, by definition, a 
matter of subjective opinion. It is absurd to attempt to apply anything like a "substantial 
evidence" measure to that legislative process. 
Utah law requires notification of proposed zoning changes and public involvement 
in the process of zoning enactment or amendments. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-402 and 
403. The rights to public notice and participation are judicially enforceable. Kg., Citizen's 
Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). 
In pursuing its authority to zone . . . [the zoning body] is performing 
a legislative function. It has the responsibility of advising itself of all 
pertinent facts as a basis for determining what is in the public interest 
in that regard. For this reason it is entirely appropriate to hold public 
hearings and to allow any interested parties it desires to give 
information and to present their ideas on the matter. 
Gayland at 635-36 (footnote omitted). It is appropriate "for the council to consider 
objections of neighbors who would have to live with the proposed use.35 Heilman v. Citv of 
Roseburg. 591 P.2d 390, 394 (Or. App. 1979). 
Allegations or implications that the City acted improperly under the influence of 
"public clamor35 are therefore fundamentally flawed. Cases dealing with public clamor have 
dealt uniformly with administrative denials of permits.2 Even in that context, the courts 
2
 Davis County v. Clearfield City (denial of a conditional use permit); C.R.P, Inv., 
Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. 1981) (denial of a special use permit 
for "quad housing55); Bd. of Comm5rs v. Teton County Youth Services. Inc., 652 P.2d 400 
(Wyo. 1982) (denial of permit for operation of youth services facility); Citvof Barnum v. 
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also find objection only where the record demonstrates that public clamor is the sole basis 
for the denial of a permit. 
Consideration of citizen views is clearly appropriate in the formulation of policy 
decisions, including zoning of large parcels of property. Given the legal requirement that 
the Council involve the public in its evaluation of a zoning change, it would be absurd to 
argue that the Council should receive public comment but not base its decision on public 
opinion. It is also incongruous to argue that the Council should limit the opportunity for 
public comment. 
One of the realities which Harmons chooses to ignore is that elected officials are 
expected to protect the interests of their constituencies in making legislative policy 
decisions. Of necessity, this involves a balancing of the interests of all property owners, not 
just those of the property owner who seeks a rezoning. In order to engage in that 
balancing, all legislative bodies, not just city councils, must listen to public opinion and 
decide how much weight to give to that opinion. 
The record demonstrates that the Council appropriately considered public comment 
and carefully balanced the opportunities for both the general public and Harmons to speak 
to the issues. In fact, at the council meeting where the rezoning was denied, more 
individuals spoke in favor of the rezoning than against it. There is no evidence that the 
"City Council relied upon (or caved into) 'public clamor3 in order to deny the re-zoning 
r^nnrv of Carlton, 386 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. App. 1986) (denial of conditional use 
permit); rhanhassen Estate Residence Assoc v. Chankassen, 342 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. 
1984) (denial of conditional use permit). 
18 
application." In fact, there is no evidence that the public input amounted to public clamor. 
Considering that public input as part of the Council's legislative deliberation of the zoning 
request was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
B. THE EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WHICH 
MIGHT ALSO SUPPORT AN ALTERNATIVE CONCLUSION 
DOES NOT MAKE THE CITY'S DECISION ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
It is important to keep in mind while reviewing the legislative record in this case that 
merely because the information presented to the council, as reflected by that record, may 
have also justified a reasonable alternative conclusion, that does not render the decision 
made by the City arbitrary, capricious or illegal or justify Harmons' request that the Court 
substitute its judgment for that of local legislative decision makers. Sandy City at 482; 
Gayland at 636. 
Nor is it determinative that the Planning Commission recommended approval of the 
rezoning. A favorable finding and recommendation by the planning commission need not 
be followed by the council. See 4 Anderson § 23.28 at 231 (". . . the recommendation of 
the planning board does not bind the legislative authority, and . . . such recommendation is 
advisory only.53); 3 Rathkopf s § 30.03 at 30-11 ("Even though it is necessary for the 
legislative body to refer proposals to the planning commission and to receive the 
recommendations of that body, it is generally held that the recommendations of the 
commission need not be followed." (citing 19 cases from various jurisdictions)). 
There is no authority for the proposition that the council must defer to 
the commission's recommendation to approve a zone change. . . . The 
council has the responsibility to make the zoning decision based upon 
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its own valid findings. It is not bound by the commission's findings 
even if they arc supported by substantial evidence. 
Heilman at 392 (emphasis added). 
The Municipal Land Use Act does not require the council to follow the planning 
commission's recommendation. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 (requiring only 
submission to planning commission for recommendation). If it did, the council's 
deliberation and all of its public hearings on zoning matters would be meaningless. The 
planning commission has no statutory authority to zone property; only the City's legislative 
body has that authority. The appointed commission recommends; the elected council as the 
governing body legislates. In exercising its zoning authority, the council is not bound by 
the recommendations of the commission and does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in not 
following those recommendations. 
Whether Harmons' proposed use might arguably be compatible with the general 
plan is also not conclusive. To begin with, the general plan is only ccan advisory guide for 
land use decisions." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-303(6)(a). Draper has not enacted an 
ordinance mandating strict compliance with the general plan as provided in § 10-9-
303 (6) (b). Further, the City has authority to amend the general plan to adapt to political 
and social changes. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-303(5)(b). It is also significant that a study 
was already in progress at the time of the rezoning request which addressed the general plan 
for the neighborhood area in which Harmons' property lies . All of these considerations 
entered into the balancing performed by the City in its deliberation over Harmons' rezoning 
application. 
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C. THE CITY ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN DENYING THE 
REZONING. 
It is important to keep in mind that the decision of the City Council was on a 3-2 
vote. This vote reflects the inherently political nature of the process, including the differing 
perceptions, judgments and balancing of interests which are a vital and necessary part of the 
municipal legislative decision making process. If Harmons had persuaded one more council 
member, it wouldn't be here. However, if the vote had been 3-2 in favor of the rezoning, it 
is possible that the Court would be reviewing the same issues in a different context. The 
ultimate issue is whose judgment should prevail. 
The council clearly considered both sides of the issue, as evidenced by 2 members 
voting in favor of the rezoning. It did not, as a body, disregard or ignore any of the 
evidence or issues. Because it reached its decision after due consideration, though there 
were obviously differing opinions as to the appropriate outcome, the decision is not 
arbitrary or capricious as a matter of law. 
Ultimately, the legislative process is political in nature and often messy. Harmons 
objects to the outcome of this political process and seeks to have the Court intervene to 
dictate a different outcome. In reality, however, its true remedy is political in nature, in the 
form of the opportunity to replace elected officials through ballot box. Harmons instead 
urges the Court to substitute its judgment on a fundamental legislative decision for that of 
the City's elected governing body. To do so, the Court must ignore a long history of 




The appropriate measure of the "arbitrary and capricious55 standard as applied to a 
legislative decision on an application for rezoning requires broad judicial deference in 
recognition of the separation of powers doctrine. The measure of "substantial evidence55 
which applies to administrative decisions does not accommodate the requisite deference and 
invites the court to substitute its judgment for that of local legislators. The Court should 
decline the invitation to reject years of well-settled, well-reasoned law to impose a new and 
more restrictive standard on legislative zoning decisions. 
The bottom line in this case is that it is reasonably debatable whether a 71,700 
square foot commercial enterprise operated on a 24-hour basis is compatible with the 
policy, goals and objectives of the mixed use, neighborhood scale development anticipated 
by the Draper City general plan. Under these circumstances, the Court must defer to the 
legislative discretion of the City Council. 
Applying the correct deferential standard to the record before the Court leads to the 
conclusion that the City did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner in denying 
Harmons5 rezoning request. The ruling of the trial court is therefore correct as a matter of 
law and should be affirmed. 
DATED this " W day of May, 1999. 
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Draper City 
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